

ORIGINAL
Aug. 1944

HEADQUARTERS 9TH INFANTRY

APO No 2, U. S. Army,
4 September 1944.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy Report - August, 1944.

TO : Commanding General, 1st U. S. Army, APO 230.

THRU : Commanding General, 2d Infantry Division,
APO No 2, U. S. Army.

Submitted herewith in quadruplicate is Action Against
Enemy, etc, Report for the month of August, 1944 together with
a copy of the Unit Journal and the Unit Journal File.

For the Regimental Commander:

1-Inclosure
Action Against Enemy
Report, etc, for the
month of August, 1944.

RICHARD C. ERNST,
1st Lieut., 9th Inf.,
Assistant Adjutant.



3-2-111111

WORTH A LITTLE SILENCE, RECONSTRUCTION / AFTER ACTION REPORT

August 1, 1944 9-1400 H

As the period began the Ninth Infantry was driving south in their sixth day of continuous fighting in a campaign which had begun on 26 July 1944 in the vicinity of St. Germain d'Elle some 15 KM's due north of their present position astride the Torigui-Ft. Aunay highway. The Regiment had lost 30 officers and 732 enlisted men but had captured 117 prisoners of war from the 5th, 9th and 15th Paratroop Regiment - an indication that the resistance of the 3rd Paratroop Division had been broken, in view of the presence of the latter Regiment - not a part of the 3rd Paratroop Division.

On our left was the 23rd Infantry Regiment and on the right, elements of the 35th Division. During the night 31 July - 1st August the 1st Battalion was dispatched southeast down the railroad line to Laune and thence was directed south to Ft. Aunay. By the time the Battalion had reached the Regimental boundary just west of Laune, the forward elements of the 23rd Infantry had come up abreast of the Ninth. In consequence, the 1st Battalion was attached to them and continued under their control during the day. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions had seized their objectives on the Torigui-Ft. Aunay highway by midnight of the 31st - objectives given to them only a few hours before.

On 1 August 1944, the 3rd Battalion attacked and seized Crossroads No. 153, 1500 yards to the southeast; the 2nd Battalion advanced to la Bibaudrie; and as day closed, the 1st Battalion moved into an assembly area in the vicinity of Ft. Aunay. The only critical period occurred early in the afternoon when the 3rd Battalion was count-erattacked by infantry and self-propelled guns. The enemy effort was contained and repelled.

Casualties incurred for the day - 14 officers and 173 enlisted men.

Prisoners taken 8

The CP moved to a position 600 yards south of la Benerie.

2 August 1944

At 0630 the Division Commander ordered the Regiment to resume the attack. The 1st Battalion was to remain stationary until the 23rd drew abreast and then would revert back to Regimental control and follow the route of the 2nd Battalion.

By 1100 all routes apparently converged in the vicinity of la Cabotiere. Elements of the 35th Division intermingled with our units because overlays overlapped. By noon, against little opposition, the Vire River was reached by the 2nd Battalion.

Colonel Hirschfelder went forward under artillery and mortar fire to direct the crossing of the river. By 1315 the 2nd Battalion, under cover of smoke had successfully negotiated the passage. By 1500, they had taken the steep slopes, with the support of tanks against determined enemy resistance and active self-propelled guns. By 1615 all three Battalions had crossed to the southern bank. Company A of the 2nd Engineers had constructed two vehicle crossings of Summerfield Track, a tank crossing and a foot bridge.

As of 2040 the 1st Battalion was northeast of Herbeliere, the 2nd Battalion was at la Mouche and the 3rd Battalion at la Fayrie, an average advance for the day of about 8 KM's for a cost of 3 officers and 68 enlisted men. 46 prisoners of war were taken.

So speedy was the advance of the Regiment that once again the Ninth Infantry was without protection on either flank. One battalion of the 35th Division had succeeded in crossing the Vire to our west but had been driven back by the enemy. In consequence the Ninth Infantry CP established north of St. Martin Don was in a precarious position. Reports were received of enemy infiltration toward the CP from the west. Firing could be heard at ever closer range. All available Headquarters Company personnel and the Antitank Company established a perimeter defense and a twenty man patrol pushed some 500 yards to the southwest to clear the area of snipers and to prevent the enemy from mounting a counterattack from that direction. 1st Lt. George Hirschfelder and S/Sgt Rease Glase of the Traffic and Security Platoon, responsible for the protection of the CP, were assigned to this duty.

3 August 1944

At 0100 orders were received to continue the attack along the designated route in the morning. At 0715 all three Battalions jumped off on time. Resistance was determined and enemy artillery and mortar fire were unusually heavy and accurate.

By 0900 the 2nd Battalion had advanced to la Genotiers 3000 yards to the south. The 3rd Battalion was unable to push farther than les Vaux and the 1st Battalion was at la Mouche. At these two forward points the 2nd Battalion and the 3rd Battalion were compelled to deploy. The 2nd Battalion was able to commit only one platoon of its reserve company because of a draw along their left boundary. The 1st Battalion was called on to seize Road Junction 161 between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, but at 1530 the attack was cancelled and the Regiment was relieved.

This was the most costly day of combat experienced by the Regiment in the campaign- 18 officers and 219 enlisted men were killed, wounded or missing. Many of the casualties may be attributed to sheer fatigue. Men's reactions were noticeably slow and many neglected to take cover when shells exploded nearby. The strength of the Regiment dropped to 2378 men and some 60% of these were replacements. At noon, during a period of fifty minutes, Major John Gandy, Regimental S-3, was killed; Major Lloyd Itak, Battalion Commander of the 3rd Battalion, and Major Frank E. Ball, 2nd Battalions Executive Officer, were wounded by artillery fire. It was the ninth day of continuous contact with the enemy. 5 prisoners of war were taken.

spearheading the Regiment on this day was "D" Company. The company lost 130 men and 4 officers during the nine day campaign. It had made an admirable name for itself and had been the outstanding unit of the Battalion. The morale within the company remained remarkably high despite the shocking losses of officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

In the 3rd of August, "D" Company was the most advanced infantry unit in the entire V Corps sector. All through the day when it moved, it did so without security on either flank. There follows a brief report of this company's operations for the period:

Company G crossed the line of departure at 0715, 3 August 1944, as the leading company of the Battalion. Having moved approximately 2100 yards, we encountered enemy long-range fire. Continued to move forward down into a draw with two platoons abreast. As we started up toward the high ground, we received cross fire from our flanks and frontal fire from the high ground.

When the assault platoons failed to advance, the support platoon was committed on the right where they ran into more enemy cross fire. Five tanks were committed in their area and the platoon advanced three hedge rows. The tanks moved forward to the next hedge row and three of them were hit by "Bazooks" and 88's. The fourth tank was out of action on hedge row to the rear. The fifth tank withdrew.

A short time afterwards a Battalion from another combat team relieved us.

Excerpts from oral statements of the Platoon Leaders:

1st Platoon:- "We moved into the attack behind the tanks. After moving three hedgerows under heavy machine gun fire, we held. While moving, four tanks were put out of action and the platoon suffered seventeen casualties. While in position I directed artillery fire on the enemy positions. Total damage for the day - 30 Germans hit, two machine guns, a tank, and 12 mortars."

2nd Platoon:- "We moved out into the attack with the second platoon on the right. We moved about 2100 yards, then hit the enemy. We got up to the hedge where the enemy was located; had an exchange of hand grenades and when we tried to go over the hedge were hit by enemy machine guns from the front, losing one of the squad leaders. During this maneuver seven Germans were hit, also a machine gun and machine pistol. During this time we were subjected to heavy machine gun fire, mortar and artillery fire. Estimated enemy casualties - 19."

3rd Platoon:- "I was the left flank platoon and when we gained contact with the enemy we were starting toward high ground. Then they caught us with cross fire and frontal fire. The section of heavy machine guns opened up on the Germans doing considerable damage. Then the Germans started using French civilians to cover

machine gun fire and then held up for our left flank was exposed and was receiving machine gun fire from there. Shortly afterward we were relieved by another battalion.

We suffered eight casualties. "Estimated German casualties - 10."

Weapons Platoon:- "I fired over a hundred rounds of mortar ammunition on the high ground to our front in support of the front line platoons. My position received 88's and mortars all during the day."

The relief of the 1st and 2nd Battalions was accomplished by midnight of 3 August and of the 3rd Battalion the next day by the 30th Infantry.

* * * * *

As the Regiment went into the Division reserve for the first time in 58 days after a ten-day drive against first-class German troops, certain statistics may prove of interest. The drive, beginning along the Commerlain - Derigny Highway on 26 July 1944 progressed 26 KM's due south over a route twisting back and forth through narrow sunken farm tracks and improvised supply routes for over 40 KM's. The Regimental sector averaged 2500 metres in width - cutting a swath through Normandy almost invariably the spearhead of the Division if not the Corps.

From D + 1 to the beginning of this attack the Regiment had suffered total casualties of 914 enlisted men and 45 officers. For the period 26 July to 4 August inclusive, 59 officers and 1154 enlisted men were killed, wounded, missing and/or evacuated.

177 Prisoners of War were evacuated through the Regimental IPW Team without counting those who were processed through the Battalion Aid Stations.

(See Interrogation Reports No. 1 and 2)

7 August 1944

After a three day rest - the first relief from contact with the enemy in 58 days - the Regiment moved south to Vire behind the 29th Division who had passed through the town to the south and east. Elements of the 2nd British Army were northeast of Vire and the boundary between them and the 1st Army ran along Highway #2 out of Vire. The Regimental CP moved to Martilly on 7 August and preparations were initiated for the relief of the 29th Division who were to take up positions on our right.

On 8 August, while not in contact with the enemy, 4 Officers and 48 enlisted men were evacuated because of enemy artillery fire.

On 9 August 1944, the relief of the 116th Infantry, southeast of Vire, was completed without untoward incident by 1600. Artillery and mortar fire inflicted 37 casualties. Three prisoners of war were taken. The 2nd Battalion was dug in on Hill #250 by dark.

A large salient existed between the Regiment and the 9th British Brigade on the left, no elements of which had advanced south of Highway #3 running due east from Vire. Despite this unfavorable position, orders were received to continue the attack to the southeast.

At 1400 on 10 August 1944 the 2nd Battalion began their move followed by the 3rd and 1st Battalions in that order. By 1640 the advance was stopped by Division order with the 2nd Battalion at La Petitiere and the 3rd Battalion just north of La Boiviniere. The 1st Battalion and the Regimental CP closed in at 1800 with the 1st Battalion occupying the reverse slope of Hill #250.

During the morning an enemy pocket of resistance was reported in the 175th Infantry sector on our right. Damaging artillery firing into the Regimental rear and machine guns covering the area northeast of 638208 compelled the dispatch of Company A into the adjoining sector.

Shortly thereafter, as the 3rd Battalion crossed Hill #250 following the 2nd Battalion, a group of enemy tanks and Infantry attacked from the southwest but were quickly driven off.

At about 2000 hours, 2 heavy enemy tanks, one light tank and a column of some seventy infantrymen were ambushed by Company G as they marched south along Highway #3 east of La Petitiere. Bazookas fired at point blank range from hedgerows bordering the road, bounced harmlessly from the tanks which made good their escape. With the help of a section of Company H heavy machine guns the German column was completely annihilated. Over forty bodies were strewn along the road for over 300 yards. Later that evening the enemy, apparently reinforced, counterattacked across an open field from the south in a line of skirmishers. The commands of German officers or Non-commissioned officers could be heard driving the Germans forward. Our machine gunners and riflemen held their fire until the enemy was within fifty yards. The counterattack was repelled with over thirty Germans cut down in the open field just south of the unimproved road running east from La Petitiere to highway #3.

Casualties: Four officers and 137 enlisted men. Four prisoners of War were taken.

On the following day, 11 August 1944, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions remained in defensive positions while the 1st Battalion took up positions on the reverse slope of Hill #274 and the Regimental CP closed in at la Molliere. Enemy artillery severely shelled the CP area and mortars and artillery inflicted 112 casualties on the Regiment. Forty-nine prisoners of war were taken by patrols. Preparations were made for a renewal of the attack to the southeast on the 12th. The 1st Battalion relieved the 2nd Battalion during the night. Between 1800-2000 hours, all five company commanders in the 2nd Battalion had been wounded. During the past 30 hours that Battalion had lost one company commander killed, the Battalion S-3 killed and six company commanders wounded.

12 August 1944

The Ninth Infantry's last engagement in Normandy occurred on 12 August 1944 and appropriately was a completely successful operation. By Division Order the attack began at 1000 hours and was halted by the same authority at 1830 some 3000 yards to the south of the line of departure.

The 1st Battalion, having relieved the 2nd Battalion during the night, jumped off from positions south of la Petitiere and advanced slowly but steadily to reach la Monerie by 1800. Moving in the face of heavy artillery and mortar fire, the Battalion captured 116 prisoners of war and counted over 50 German dead in their immediate zone of advance.

The 3rd Battalion, whose line of departure ran through la Boivoniere, meeting the same type of heavy fire pushed slowly but steadily forward until halted along the unimproved road south of les Brieres at 1830.

The operation was noteworthy in two respects - 1) 294 walking prisoners were taken by the Regiment - at least 20 more being evacuated through medical channels; 2) The superior job performed by all unit commanders in leading and controlling their troops, now largely composed of replacements with only a few months basic training. In this latter connection, it should be remarked that without experienced officers or non-commissioned officers to push the men forward, enemy shell bursts within a hundred yard radius normally causes a recruit to bury himself in the nearest hole, to emerge only when prodded. The steady progress of the Regiment on this day testifies to the indefatigable and aggressive leadership displayed by the troops leaders in all echelons of command.

Our casualties were 8 officers and 173 enlisted men. 2173

At about 1100 hours the Regimental Adjutant, the Headquarters Commandant and the Communications Officer went forward from the CP at la Morliere to reconnoitre an area in the vicinity of la Boivoniere to establish a new CP. At la Petitiere just south of the 2nd Battalion positions the party were suddenly caught in a crossfire of enemy machine guns - a pocket of resistance remaining behind the advancing front lines. For several hours the Adjutant and Headquarters Commandant were pinned down behind a house, both sides of which were swept by enemy machine guns. The rest of the party prevented enemy infiltration by establishing a base of fire some yards behind the house. Finally reinforcements arrived to drive the enemy back. In the meantime the Adjutant had fired his last round of ammunition with good effect into one German who had succeeded in reaching the house and was preparing to toss a grenade. One man in the group was killed as he fired a bazooka toward one of the enemy machine gun positions.

That afternoon the CP moved forward into the area so recently cleared.

On 13 August 44 the Regiment was once again placed in Division reserve, the 38th Infantry passing through our positions, but for at least 36 hours no appreciable benefit accrued because of the constant artillery and mortar fire which fell over the entire sector. Casualties evacuated during this period amounted to 4 officers and 163 enlisted men.

18 - 19 August 1944

After four days devoted to rest, cleaning up and re-organization, The Regiment received orders assigning them to the VIII Corps whose mission was to seize the fortified port of Brest some 230 miles from la Fouissardiere, the Regimental CP. On the 17th, the advance party, composed of 10 officers and 52 enlisted men, left in two $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks and two $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, spending the night in Dol, 70 miles away, and arriving at their destination at Lesneven, Brittany the next afternoon.

The Regiment, leading the Division, loaded on trucks and crossed the IP east of St Pois at 161800. An advance march unit under Captain Vernon T. Adler left several hours previously, posting 200 guides along the 210 mile route. The remainder of the Regiment moved in three serials - each composed of four march units - a total of 109 - $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 142 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 31 $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, 12 $3/4$ ton trucks and 3 ambulances.

The CP moved with the first march serial and the new CP opened in the vicinity of Ploudaniel at 190915 after an uneventful trip. Seven vehicles were delayed - five motor failures and two accidents, both of a minor nature.

The following day the Ninth Infantry relieved the 28th Infantry in position around the Brest airfield and the CP moved to the village of Karaziou. No enemy action was reported for the day. On 21 August, intermittent small arms, mortar and artillery fire fell throughout the Regimental area. 20 EM were evacuated. The companies organized their positions maintaining contact with the 28th Infantry on the right and the 23rd Infantry on the left. The CP moved to l'Ormeau.

A considerable amount of valuable military information was obtained from civilian evacuees from Brust and its environs, almost total evacuation of the French population having been ordered by the Germans three days prior to our arrival in the area. For the first time large numbers of VFI personnel were observed but did not operate at Regimental levels.

Between 22 - 24 August, readjustments were made in the front lines to conform to Division boundaries. Patrols constantly probed south to determine the enemy dispositions and strength. 3 officers and 48 enlisted men were evacuated.

At 1300 on 25 August 1944, the Regiment attacked within their zone of action with the 1st Battalion on the left and the 2nd on the right. After a 20 minute artillery preparation, rapid initial progress was halted along a line roughly paralleling the black-top road running from Quirivas to Gouernou, 200 yards from the line of departure. What was presumed to be the enemy's lightly held OLR showed aspects of a VLR in the number of dug in emplacements, stubborn resistance encountered, and the bold and effective use of self-propelled 88's. Mortar fire destroyed three supporting tanks in the 1st Battalion sector. One tank turned over south of the black-top attempting to maneuver. Its unhurt occupants, remained buttoned up inside for two days, until the ground was taken by C Company. At night German patrols on several occasions knocked on the hull but were apparently unaware that there was a crew alive inside.

At 1840, the CP moved into enemy evacuated concrete pill boxes on the southeast of the airfield, barely 300 yards behind the front lines. Transportation was compelled to remain some 500 yards further north at the time because of enemy direct artillery and small

amrs fire. Once established, however, the site was exceptionally helpful in maintaining control, and, because of the availability of many bombproof dugouts, exceptionally safe. 1st Lt Raymond E Matteson, I & R Platoon Leader, was killed on this afternoon while observing the front from a control tower. Colonel Hirschfelder, Regimental Commander, had spent considerable time there and only climbed down 30 minutes previously, when enemy machine gun began to fire directly at him. At that time, he advised Lt Matteson to chose some less conspicuous and vulnerable spot. Lt Matteson remained at the OP, disregarding consideration for his own safety because of the ideal observation obtainable there. A direct hit from a 105 gun demolished the tower and killed Lt Matteson.

Casualties for the day: Officers - 1 killed in action. wounded in action. Enlisted Men - 4 killed in action, 3 missing in action, 77 wounded in action. Prisoners taken - 7.

26 August 44

During the night 25-26 August frequent exchanges of hand grenades took place all along the front lines indicating the closeness of contact maintained with the enemy throughout the night.

At 0645, Company C withdrew to the Regimental CP area to permit firing of 8 inch guns and 155 MM howitzers on pill boxes located to their immediate front. At 0715x the plan was discarded because of poor visibility, but 40 minutes of 105 MM and 155 MM artillery was fired to cover the re-occupation of the positions.

At 0800, both the 1st and 2nd Battalions attacked. Very heavy enemy machine gun, mortar and artillery fire was encountered throughout the day, over 100 rounds of 88 MM direct fire blasting the 1st Battalion CP area between 1545 and 1615.

By 1000 hours, B and C Companies had not been able to advance. B Company had crossed the black-top but was receiving fire from the southwest, south and southeast. 400 yards to the east, C Company had been unable to cross the road and were also receiving fire from both flanks, particularly from a group of recognizable pill boxes to the southeast in the 23rd Infantry area. A Company was committed between B and C with the mission of clearing the village of Kermao. By nightfall, A and B were on line just one field south of B Company's line of departure. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion, unable to advance at first and unsuccessful in local outflanking attempts, shortened their line by pulling G Company from their right flank southeast of Gouesnou, to the rear of E Company northeast of Keralleunoc.

2 Platoons of K Company took up the positions thus vacated. E Company after very heavy fighting, was able to push south 500 yards to the east of Bourg-Neuf, followed by one platoon of G Company. F Company north of the village, got one platoon south 200 yards from its line of departure, but pulled it back at dark.

The nature of the terrain - hedgerows, and the nature of the enemy defenses - pill boxes, barbedwire, mines, deeply dug in, cleverly camouflaged emplacements, dugouts, trenches, required a high degree of teamwork among the smallest units. It was just this teamwork that was lacking because of the fact that the Regiment was no longer the same highly trained outfit that had landed in France on 7 June 44. Over 3000 officers and enlisted men had been evacuated, and, unfortunately if inevitably, almost the complete fighting roster of officers and non-commissioned officers was gone. All the invaluable training in the attack of a fortified position - the use of flame throwers, bangalore torpedoes, pole and satchel charges, etc, had been had in

vain. On 24-25 August, six men per company were sent to the rear for instructions in the use of the flame thrower. The responsibility of leadership had never been more onerous. To lead and control recruits under fire required constant exposure to fire, indefatigable supervision of every soldier's actions.

Casualties for 26 August 44: Officers - 8 wounded.

Enlisted Men - 25 killed in action, 165 wounded in action.

17 officers and 258 enlisted replacements were received 23-26 August.

5 prisoners of war were taken.

27 August 1944

Only C Company was involved in active operations this day, making a limited objective attack. C Company reduced a strongly held fortified position guarding the crossroads northwest of Kermac and joined the other front line companies south of the black-top road running from Guipavas to Gouesnou.

Both flanks of the Regiment were still exposed and the enemy continued to hold commanding ground to the front. Their fire was incessant- over 250 rounds of direct fire artillery falling in the 1st Battalion area during the period. Our Air Corps was active bombing and strafing the enemy lines in rear areas. Fires in the outskirts of Brest burned all day. All of the roads south of the black-top were mined. 3 of our tanks in the C Company area were lost in attempting to reach the 2nd Battalion. Coming to an obstacle in the road some 300 yards south of the black-top, they turned into a field to by-pass the road block. The fields were mined with 5 rows of carefully camouflaged French or Belgian mines buried 3 to 6 inches below the sod. One tank got through, apparently without damage but was abandoned. One hit the last mine in one row and lost its track. The third apparently

made aware of the presence of danger while in the middle of the field, turned directly back toward the road, detonated two mines on the edge of the field without being stopped but was destroyed by an enemy bazooka. No tank corps casualties were reported. 4-179

Two hot meals of ten-in-one or C rations were being fed to all troops, each day after dark. The men and officers carried with them to the front one blanket and one shelter half but despite inclement weather, few cases of respiratory diseases appeared. (See monthly Medical Report, 2d Infantry Division). Casualties: Officers - 3 wounded in action; Enlisted Men - 11 killed in action, 48 wounded in action. 4 prisoners of war taken.

28 August 1944

Close contact was maintained throughout the night - one hedge-row between the opposing forces. E Company engaged in frequent skirmishes during the night. C Company consolidated their newly won positions found to consist of concrete emplacements surrounded by wire entanglements, cleared fields of fire and communication trenches.

At 1000 hours, the Regiment renewed the attack with 3 Battalions abreast. By 1050, only G Company had been able to reach the unimproved road 400 yards south of the the blacktop but by the end of a hard days fighting A, B, G, F, and I Companies were on line - an average gain of 500 yards. K Company remained to the right rear of the Regiment unable to move because of the 28th Infantry's inability to advance. A Company led by Capt. Cameron Clough, attacked between B Company and C Company and succeeded in seizing the village of Kermec. Capt. Clough had personally carried the flame thrower that destroyed the first enemy emplacement holding up the advance of the Company. He crossed an open field alone, covered by the fire of his men. By such leadership, evidences of which

were displayed throughout the Regiment, raw troops drove back German Para-troops sworn to defend their positions to the last man. (But see IPW Reports for 30-31 August and Interrogation Report #2). After reaching Kermao, a captured American light tank emblazoned with a swastika attacked up the road running southwest from the village. Capt., Clough, having no bazooka ammunition at hand, directed the firing of a captured 37 MM gun on the tank. The gun carried no sights but 3 rounds fired in rapid succession caused the tank to retreat. The fighting strength of this company was now only 96 men.

The 2nd Battalion reported that the area to the front and right of their zone of action, vicinity of Bourg-Neuf, was honey-combed with dug-in emplacements, with deep communication trenches connecting as many as two and three fields. From these trenches, the enemy fired without being observed. It was necessary to burn and smoke all the houses in and around Bourg-Neuf before we could advance in that sector.

The 3rd Battalion received direct artillery fire from the high ground west of Bourg-Neuf and were harassed all day with devastating fire from SP guns running up and down the trail north and southwest of that village.

Artillery fire from this same general area blanketed the Regimental CP. No damage was done. At 200 hours, however, a single stray mortar shell hit a building housing two liaison officers's vehicles and wounded 5 men. All through these days, at frequent intervals, small arms bullets chipped the concrete runways, tinkled through windows and whistled over head.

Cannon Company maintained an OP under the eaves of one of the administrative buildings on the airfield from which observation of the entire front could be obtained. Two enemy artillery pieces were destroyed

and the destruction observed. On the 29th, the OP was changed just before flying debris crashed through the building, tearing off the roof.

Casualties for the day: Officers - 1 killed in action, 2 wounded in action; Enlisted Men - 14 killed in action, 4 missing in action, 153 wounded in action. 141 replacements were received. 114 prisoners of war were processed through the IPW cage.

A German major, an English speaking NCO and a German Navy petty officer came through our outposts under a flag of truce with three US MAC officers and 8 US Medical Corpsmen with a letter addressed to General Middleton, the VIII Corps commander. After concluding some agreement in connection with location of hospital areas in Brest, the Germans were blindfolded and returned through our lines without incident. While held in our IPW dugout, casual questioning elicited a few interesting sidelights. The major refused to have his picture taken. The English speaking NCO remarked at one point that it was 5:00 PM "Double British Summer Time", and later made the remark in passing, "When you get to Brest, - -. " The major requested and was given permission to take back with him a half eaten K ration.

29 August 1944

At 291000 August 1944, after very light preparation fires, the Regiment resumed the attack south, making the main effort of the Division. The character of the enemy resistance remained unchanged, but by 1157 hours, A Company and B Company had advance 800 yds to take their objective on Hill 90. They were ordered to consolidate and support the attack of the 2nd Battalion on their right. By 1444 hours F and G Companies were abreast of the 1st Battalion.

I Company fought its way into the outskirts of Bourg-Neuf, but could not hold the positions because of the violence of the enemy fire. By the end of the day the 3rd Battalion were re-grouped around Bourg-Neuf.

Company E of the 5th Ranger Battalion, was attached to protect the Regimental right flank.

Prisoners of war had reported impending counter-attacks from time to time in the last few days. Some confirmation appeared when reports were received of the loss of some 2 companies of the 28th Infantry on our right. At 1900 hours an enemy patrol of 9 to 15 men penetrated to the rear of the 1st Battalion CP, but were driven off. One prisoner was taken and 8 of the enemy killed. Almost immediately a counter-attack was launched in company strength directed at the gap between A Company and the 23rd Infantry and another strong patrol attempted to penetrate between B Company and G Company. By 2100 the attack was repelled. A Company killed about 15 Germans and captured 10. Our artillery destroyed about 60 more as they retreated to their lines. Capt Cameron Clough, again distinguished himself by remaining in command of his company from 1600 when he was temporarily blinded by fragments from a grenade until 2200 when the area was quiet and secure. Capt Clough has permanently lost the sight of one eye.

The outstanding incident of the day occurred some 500 yards due south of the Regimental CP in the 23rd Infantry sector. There in the face of an attack by I Company of the 23rd Infantry, the enemy detonated hundreds of pounds of TNT and ammunition stored in six pill boxes. Those who set off the explosions came over to our lines as prisoners and a few minutes later a tremendous explosion took place followed by several smaller explosions. Chunks of concrete two feet square flew 700 to 800 yards and the whole Regimental CP area was showered with debris. I Company suffered very large casualties and, as of this writing, still listed 14 men as missing.

Casualties of the day: Officers - 10 wounded in action.
Enlisted Men - 109 wounded in action. Prisoners of war captured - 16.

30 August 1944

Enemy resistance continued to exhibit a ferocity and determination unsurpassed in this Regiment's experience in France. Every road was covered with machine gun and mortar fire and enemy artillery fell throughout the period. The enemy had to be driven from their dug in positions with bayonet and grenade.

The 1st and 2nd Battalions readjusted their lines. Company A occupied two fields further to the east to close the gap existing between us and the 23rd Infantry. The 3rd Battalion of that Regiment was attached to the Ninth at 1445. Company B occupied two fields to the right rear while Company G moved south five fields to close the gap between the 1st and 2nd Battalions.

At 1215 hours the 3rd Battalion attacked to clean out the pocket holding up the right flank of the Regiment. Very stiff resistance was met all along the line. At 1330 hours the enemy counter-attacked between the 3rd Battalion and Company E, 5th Ranger Battalion. The Rangers - numbering only 69 men repelled the attack with prompt and aggressive counter-action, suffering 5 casualties. At the end of the day, Company K had occupied all the houses in Bourg-Neuf; Companies I and L were echeloned to the south facing west.

Casualties: Officers - 2 killed in action, 2 wounded in action. Enlisted Men - 11 killed in action, 1 missing in action, 84 evacuated (including 5 non-battle casualties). Prisoners of war taken - 39.

31 August 1944

The day passed without any major operation attempted. All front line companies continued in close contact, exchanging rifle fire and grenades with the enemy. The 3rd Battalion 23rd Infantry, moved south several hundred yards without resistance to come abreast of our front lines. Enemy artillery continued to pound our positions but the weight of the shelling diminished noticeably. Mortars and SP guns were active all day. At no point in the sector could our patrols penetrate more than two fields without attracting heavy machine gun fire.

Prisoner of War information elicited by Capt. Podlesski, CO. IPW Team #28, indicates that present front lines have reached but the first of three German MLR's. (See IPW Report 31 Aug 1944).

Casualties - Enlisted Men - 4 KIA, 23 SNA, 27 NBC. Replacements received: 4 Officers, 129 EM.

Prisoners of War taken - 15.

As the month closed the strength of the Regiment had dropped to 2683 EM and 140 Officers and Warrant Officer. During the month which included only 12 days of active operations and 6 more days of contact, casualties were as follows:

	: Officers	: Enlisted	:
Killed	: 10	: 128	:
Wounded and/or Evacuated	: 92	: 1837	:
Missing	: 1	: 36	:
	: <u>103</u>	: <u>2001</u>	:
Total	- - - - -	- - - - -	2104

During the same period 1826 replacements were received including some 300 former member of the Ninth, returned from the hospital. 77 Officer replacements were received. The above casualty figures include evacuated cases of all descriptions. Reference is made to the Medical Report, Hqs, 2nd Inf. Div., month of August for breakdown of these

Total Prisoners of War processed through Regimental IPW Cage
for the month of August 1944 - 626.

Sept. 1944
ORIGINAL

2nd INFANTRY DIVISION

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY
AFTER ACTION REPORTS
FOR SEPTEMBER 1944

REPORTS AFTER ACTION - AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Brest Campaign (Cont'd)

1 September 1944

At the beginning of the period the three battalions were on line some six miles north of Brest: the Third on the right, Second in the center and the First on the left. The 1st and 2nd Battalions had breached the enemy main line of resistance in the Kermac area and were holding while the 3rd Battalion cleared out the German strongholds at Fournuef and Bourg-Neuf.

Fournuef, a key village adjacent to Bourg-Neuf, was rimmed with pillboxes and emplacements which were blocking the advance of the 9th Infantry and the 121st Infantry toward Brest and which included among its defending troops the 4th Company, 7th Parachute Regiment, and a platoon of the 8th Company of the same regiment.

The assault on Fournuef was made by Company I and Company L striking simultaneously at 1000 hours from positions northeast and east of the village. I Company attacked the prepared defenses frontally, while L Company strove to envelope the enemy by advancing south across the Fournuef road and then west into the village.

The fighting, much of it at close range, with bayonets, was so severe and casualties on both sides so heavy that neither company achieved its objective immediately. The German grip on Fournuef, however, was loosened by the ferocity of the attack and by subsequent artillery fire, and during the night the enemy withdrew.

At Fournuef the 1st Platoon of I Company was wiped out as a fighting unit. Losses for the entire Battalion during three days of fighting for Bourg-Neuf and Fournuef were 45 officers and men killed and 110 wounded.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
CLASSIFICATION SECRETARY ARMY
DATE 17 Jun 86
BY David Dickinson INITIAL - ghw

303-1N-1(9)-0-3

Twenty-five German dead were counted around the Fournеuf defenses. Fifty-seven Germans who wished to surrender but could not get through our intense fire gave themselves up to units of the 9th Infantry on the right; nine surrendered to Co. K.

For its heroism and skill in smashing the German line the 3rd Battalion was recommended for a Distinguished Unit Citation. (The attached statement contains a complete account of the Fournеuf - Bourg-Neuf operation.)

Casualties: 1 Officer, 96 enlisted men. Replacements: 124 enlisted men and 22 officers. See attached monthly IPW Report for PW totals.

2 September 1944

All battalions remained in close contact with the enemy. The 3rd Battalion moved in to occupy Fournеuf and the ground beyond. Against artillery, mortar and machine gun fire, the 2nd Battalion sparred for high ground near Morlen. The 1st Battalion, in the farthest advance of the day, reached the outskirts of Kerven, 1500 yards south of the Fournеuf road. an enemy ammunition dump 2,000 yards to the front was reported hit by our artillery. Casualties: 56 enlisted men and 5 officers. Replacements: 237 enlisted men and 7 officers.

3 September 1944

Enemy withdrawal to the southeast continued. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced south and west against comparatively light fire. The 1st Battalion, although encountering heavy machine gun fire, sent patrols south of Kerven.

During the day the 3rd Battalion was pinched out by our 2nd Battalion and by the 1st Battalion of the 121st Infantry, and retired to a rest area near Gouesnou, at Penhoat. Casualties: EM 69, Officers 30. Replacements: EM 64, Officers 15.

4 Sept 1944

The advance now had reached a point where many buildings in Brest were in plain view of our troops. All day the 1st Battalion was at grips with the enemy around Guataodon Chau, south of Kerven. At 2000 hours the 2nd Battalion was pinched out by the 1st Battalion of the 38th Infantry and retired to the rest area. Our 1st Battalion thereupon was attached temporarily to the 38th Regiment. Casualties: EM 42, Officers 4. Replacements: EM 33, Officers 1.

5 - 7 Sept 1944

Upon completion of relief of 2nd Battalion, 9th Infantry, by the 38th Infantry, at 050015 Sept 44, the 1st Bn 9th Infantry became attached to the 38th Infantry.

Battalion CP was located at co-ordinates 9935-0335 map France with "A" Company on the left and "B" Company on the right, "C" Company in reserve. Front line extended generally along a line 989029--984035. The Battalion was in a defensive position in close contact with the enemy and maintained contact with units on both flanks by patrols. These units were the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 38th Infantry.

Primary mission of the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry was to keep close contact with the enemy and support, by fire, the anticipated attack to be made by the 38th Infantry. During the period of attachment the 38th Infantry effected TOT concentrations and had propaganda broadcasts in which the 1st Bn 9th Infantry participated.

Battalion was relieved by 3rd Battalion 38th Infantry and reverted back to the 9th Infantry at 071450 Sept 44 at Penhoat.

Casualties: EM 45, Officers 1. Replacements: EM 87, Officers 5.

11 September 1944

The Regiment set out on the last lap to Brest, ultimate objective in this campaign. The plan was for the 9th Infantry to relieve the 8th Infantry Division in a sector north of Brest, and leaving the rest area at Gouesnou, the Regiment moved forward to an assembly area in the suburban districts of Kerleguer, Lambazellec and Mesmerian.

12 September 1944

The Regiment completed the task of relieving the 13th Infantry and the 121st Infantry during the hours of darkness, and during the rest of the day improved and consolidated positions. Regimental C. P. was moved to Lambazellec, where it remained until after the fall of Brest.

13 September 1944

Battalion alignment was: First on the right, Third in the Center and Second on the left. Patrols from the 1st Battalion reached the Penfeld River line in front of its sector. A reinforced platoon from "I" Company occupied houses in Kergoat.

14 September 1944

Operations during this period centered around aggressive night patrols, which succeeded in reaching the stone-and-earthen wall that surrounds Brest. This ancient wall, dating back to 1680, constituted together with a thirty-foot ditch in front of it, a difficult obstacle for our troops.

15 Sept 1944

A 3rd Battalion patrol got within 75 yards of the wall before being stopped by artillery fire, while a 2nd Battalion patrol reconnected the wall in its sector. The 1st Battalion sent patrols along the river. Harassing fire was now being delivered on Brest 24 hours a day.

16 Sept 1944

Large fires along the river and inside the wall were visible from all O. P.'s. At 0900 hours 159 Russian soldiers who had been with the German forces in Brest surrendered to "C" Company. These troops, all of them engaged in unloading supplies at the U-boat pens, apparently were distrusted by the Germans and were disarmed and sent to our lines under a white flag.

17 Sept 1944

The campaign reached its climax with the entry of 9th Infantry troops into Brest. Patrols had begun jabbing at the wall and ditch long before dawn, and activity increased at 1000 hours when four combat patrols, two each from the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, were sent out with the mission of crossing the ditch and occupying high ground between the ditch and a bluff just north of the Penfeld River. The 2nd Battalion patrols reached the ditch in their sector, but were pinned down by heavy enemy mortar, machine gun and rifle fire. One of the 3rd Battalion patrols was stopped by intense machine gun fire also, but the second patrol, from "I" Company, pushed through to the wall at the western border of the city, 150 yards from a bridge across the Penfeld River.

The break-through came at about 1600 hours. I Company's assault platoons followed, and behind them a short time later came K and L Companies. As soon as all three companies were inside the wall the Battalion, in a column of companies, began a steady advance into the city along the Penfield River.

In contrast to some of the bitter fighting of the month-long siege the actual break-through was accomplished without serious opposition. Apparently surprised and disheartened by our final thrust, the Germans made only a weak stand in Brest and surrendered by the thousands. Our casualties in the city were light. By nightfall Company I, spearheading the advance, had moved more than 1000 yards beyond the breach in the wall.

For hours before the break-through I Company probed the western defenses of Brest with patrols. The first patrol, from the 2nd Platoon advanced from Kerele, a community 1,500 yards north of the city, at 1100 hours, worked its way east to a concrete road along the Penfield River, and then cut back toward Brest as far as the suburb of Kergoat, where it was pinned down by machine gun fire, believed to have come from across the river. The mission of this patrol had been to get through the wall, dig in and send a messenger back to lead the 1st Platoon into Brest by the same route. The 1st Platoon was waiting in an area between Kergoat and Kerele. If this plan had been successful, then the rest of the company stationed at Kerele, was going to move into the city on the heels of the 1st Platoon.

While the patrol was still pinned down, however, the 1st Platoon was moved out at 1230 on Battalion order and advanced to Kergoat near the patrol from the 2nd Platoon. There the 1st Platoon set up a defensive position. The patrol rejoined the 2nd Platoon.

After the 1st Platoon had secured a defensive position at Kergoat the rest of the company moved in and occupied it, and the 1st Platoon went on 200 yards to the second hedgerow west of the wall.

From this new position the 1st Platoon sent out a patrol with the mission of finding a gap in the wall and reporting the location of it. In this section the wall is relatively weak. Although made entirely of stone, it stands only about eight feet high and is between six inches and a foot thick. When it reached the wall, the patrol found a five-foot gap, which appeared to have been torn by artillery fire. The location was reported. A patrol thereupon was sent out from the 2nd Platoon with the mission of going through the gap into the city. The mission was accomplished at about 1600 hours.

When 1st Lt. William J. Ray, commander of I Company, received word that the wall had been successfully breached, he ordered the 1st Platoon through the gap and began clearing the area for the advance of the rest of the company and the Battalion. One squad from the 1st Platoon worked along the river, another along the wall. The rest of the company meanwhile was moved up to the point outside the wall where the 1st Platoon had been.

The first enemy encountered were seventeen Germans in a tunnel a short distance inside the wall. They surrendered without a fight. From a tunnel across the river, in the 28th Division sector, machine guns fired on I Company. Fire was returned with a bazooka, and while Lt Ray was bringing up rifle grenades for a heavier concentration, the enemy fire ceased,

and about eighty Germans came out and surrendered to a unit of the 29th Division.

With this menace removed from its right flank, the 1st Platoon continued its advance along the waterfront. The chosen avenue of approach was a long corridor bounded on the south by the river and on the north by a high embankment containing tunnels used by the Germans for hospitals and barracks. At 1900 hours the rest of "I" Company moved through the wall, followed next by "K" Company and then by "L" Company, and the Battalion advanced in a column of companies in that order.

Some rifle and grenade fire was encountered, but the swarms of prisoners constituted the main barrier to swift advance. The Battalion was still advancing after dark more than 1,000 yards from where it had entered the city when a halt was ordered for the night.

18 Sept 1944

The following extract from the Regimental Combat Report dated 18 September 44 constitutes a complete record of the operations of the Regiment on this last day of combat for the month of September:

By 172200 the 3rd Battalion had closed inside the Brest City wall after its successful penetration at the junction of the wall and the river described in 162200 Combat Report. Occupying the low ground to the south of the escarpment inside the wall, I and K Companies were subjected to hand grenades and machine gun fire from their rear. The enemy there located numbered 250 and were armed with 30 machine guns and several mortars. The 3rd Battalion was ordered to resume the attack at 0900 hours from a line of

departure just north of the 00 grid line (Map: France 1/10,000, Sheet: Brest).

The 2nd Battalion was ordered to cross the moat in their sector and scale the wall prior to 180700 with two (2) companies. Their mission was to drive the enemy from above described escarpment prior to the attack of the 3rd Battalion.

By 0830 the 2nd Battalion had successfully accomplished their mission. All enemy resistance was overcome.

"I" Company, moving to the line of departure at daybreak met no resistance and established themselves along a line NE along road from 946994 by 0900. At that time "K" and "L" Companies moved through "I" Company attacking south with "K" Company on the left and "L" Company on the right; "I" Company to occupy the arsenal at 945986 when the other two (2) companies reached the wall running NE from 946987. Enemy resistance consisted of heavy of heavy machine gun fire coming from buildings and ruins throughout the zone of advance. "K" Company encountered particularly heavy fire from a pocket of German Paratroopers at 949997.

At 1200 hours elements of the three (3) rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion combing each block through the Old City of Brest were approaching Rue Emile Zola bordering President Wilson Place on the northwest. A Parliamentary came through the front lines under a flag of truce with a message requesting the Commanding Officer of the American troops in Brest to meet with the German Commander. The emissary refused to deal with any officer of lesser rank. Major William F Kernan, 3rd Battalion Commanding Officer, with a group of five (5) officers met the emissary outside the tunnel entrance to the underground hospital at the hospital at 94859924

~~SECRET~~

and was led through the hospital to the Regimental CP of the 7th Paratroop Regiment which was located in a concrete building at ground level just off President Wilson Place.

Colonel Erich Pietzonka and his staff were present. After introductions, Colonel Pietzonka asked if Major Kernan ever heard of him. He then continued the conversation by complimenting Major Kernan on the skill displayed by the American troops in penetrating the German defenses. He stated that he had been surprised by the final maneuver. He further stated something to the effect that re-supply of arms had been landed in the 29th Division sector some time previously in anticipation of an attack from that direction. The Colonel expressed himself as willing to surrender but wanted it clearly understood that he was not in communication with any of his subordinate units and could not guarantee that his orders would reach them. He warned of the possibility of some continued fighting by isolated groups. He requested an acknowledgement that his troops had fought honorably and upon being assured that the negotiations were being conducted in good faith the following armistice terms were agreed upon:

- (1) Both sides cease firing.
- (2) French civilians to be barred from the City of Brest until German troops were evacuated.
- (3) German troops to be adequately guarded from French (Terrorists".
- (4) All German able bodied troops to leave their arms in their dugouts and assemble in President Wilson Place at 1500 hours when a formal surrender would be made.

These preliminary negotiations were concluded by 1250 hours and the Colonel issued his orders. American officers and enlisted men were sent with German messengers under a white flag to carry the order to the various elements of the garrison of Brest. A copy of this order and a translation thereof is attached.

Surrender terms were then negotiated subject to confirmation by the by the 9th Infantry Regimental Commander, who was on his way to President Wilson Place.

The matters brought up and agreed upon were as follows:

(1) Colonel Pietzonka requested an acknowledgement that he had fought honorably and according to the rules of war.

(2) Colonel Pietzonka reiterated his request that French civilians be bared from the city until all German troops were evacuated.

(3) Colonel Pietzonka requested that guards be put on all hospitals, stating his fear of excesses committed by French "Terrorists". He reported large supplies of foodstuffs and medical supplies stored in the hospitals.

(4) Colonel Pietzonka requested that the women who had worked around his Headquarters be given protection from the French and be evacuated through US Army channels.

On these four points Major Kernan assured the Colonel that his request were entirely in order.

At 1400, a message was received through Captain Vernon T Adler, Battalion Executive Officer, that Captain Heino Handl, Commanding Officer, 1st Bn, 7th Paratroop Regiment desired to surrender to Major Kernan. Captain Handl was told to report in person to Colonel Pietzonkas Headquarters.

Colonel C J Hirschfelder arrived at the CP at 1420. He confirmed the terms tentatively agreed upon and assured Colonel Pietzonka that he and his officers would be evacuated by motor transport with their personal baggage. Colonel Hirschfelder also gave his consent to the separation of the officers orderlies from the other prisoners.

At 1450 Major General Robertson arrived at President Wilson Place and witnessed the formal surrender of the garrison of Brest. Some 400 German prisoners had gathered in the square and more streamed in as quickly as those were marched off to the IPW forward collecting point. Some difficulties were experienced in separating these German prisoners able to be evacuated through regular IPW channels from the large number of Germans gathered in the subterranean hospital under President Wilson Place.

PWs evacuated through medical channels not tabulated. At 2130 2154 PWs were evacuated through the IPW cage. Among these captured was a Marine Vice Admiral and staff and the Commanding Officer of the 7th Parachute Regiment with Staff.

TRANSLATION OF

ORDER FOR SURRENDER OF BREST GARRISON

Sector East

18.9.44

1400 hrs.

TO ALL COMBAT TEAMS:

From the sector West came the suggestion for a truce. Americans penetrated into the heart of the City from West and North. CP completely surrendered. A truce affecting all units of the Sector East is necessary at once. Am leaving the final decision

to the individual Combat Teams. We, at Wilson Square, are powerless. If the occasion necessitates it, destroy all weapons and assemble at Wilson Square at 1600 hrs. We have performed our duties to the last.

Hail Fuehrer, People and Fatherland:

Signed: PIETZONKA,

Colonel and Commanding Officer
Sector East.

A, the month concluded the Regiment was in the process of moving up into an assembly area in the vicinity of St Vith, Province of Malmedy, Belgium. Some 900 men travelling on organic transportation left Landerneau, Brittany on the morning of 27 September and closed into St Vith on 30 September. The remainder of the Regiment entrained during the night 27-28 September in 67 boxcars and two coaches at Landerneau. The first train arrived in Longuyon, France at 1600 30 September 44 and the second train closed in during the night.

The month will be remembered, of course, for the spectacularly successful capture of Brest, for the many prisoners captured and for the bloodlessness of the final assault - only eight men were killed and seventeen wounded from 11 September to 18 September 1944. The entire campaign, however, cost in casualties 1295 enlisted men and 55 officers.

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY

S 2 0 3 2 T
Auth: CC, 9th Div
Date: 2 Nov 1944
Initials: *[Signature]*
APO #2, U. S. Army,
3 November 1944.

SUBJECT: Action against Enemy, Reports
After/ After Action Reports.

TO : Commanding General,
1st United States Army,
APO #230, U. S. Army.

THRU : Commanding General,
2nd Infantry Division,
APO #2, U. S. Army.

Submitted herewith Action Against Enemy, Reports After/
After Action Reports for the month of October 1944.

For the Regimental Commander:

[Signature]
W. E. WHITNEY,
Captain, 9th Infantry,
Adjutant.

- 3 Incls:
✓ Incl 1 - After Action Report.
✓ Incl 2 - Unit Journal.
✓ Incl 3 - Unit Journal File.

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[Signature]
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AFTER ACTION REPORT

OCTOBER 1944

At the beginning of the period the 9th Infantry, fresh from the victory at Brest, was on the way to Germany and the final showdown battles of the war. The entry into Germany on 4 October 1944 came almost 25 years after the Regiment, travelling the same general route through Luxemburg and Belgium, had first entered Germany after the Armistice in November 1919 as part of the Army of Occupation.

Between the surrender of Brest on 18 September and the arrival of the Regiment on the Siegfried line on 4 October the days were devoted to rest, reorganization and travel. The movement to Germany began when the advance detail left Landernau, near Brest, by vehicle on 26 September at 0800 hours. The organic transportation, under the command of Major Frank E. Ball, crossed the I.P. on 27 September at 0620 in two serials composed of five march units. Nine hundred officers and men, including personnel of the 2nd Medical Battalion, travelled in this convoy, which made the trip of more than 575 miles in these stages:

1st Day	Landernau to St. Aubin
2nd Day	St. Aubin to Chateauneuf
3d Day	Chateauneuf to St. Quentin
4th Day	St. Quentin to Schonberg, Belgium -

The trip was accomplished without an accident. There were only four mechanical breakdowns and all the vehicles that started the trip closed into St Vith with the column.

The bulk of the troops travelled most of the way to Germany by rail, leaving Landernau in two trains on the night of 27 September. The trip was made in World War I style

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in Forty-and-eight boxcars - 40 Hommes, 8 Cheviaux - with 34 men to the car.

The first day brief stops were made at Rennes and LeMans. The second day the troops had a distant view of Paris. The third day, 30 September, they passed through World War battlements around Verdun and arrived at Longuyon in Northeastern France, terminus of the rail journey. From the station a steep and slippery 2½ mile march was made to fields above the town where the night was passed in bivouac.

1 October

At 1300 hours the Regiment left Longuyon by motor convoy for Schonberg, Belgium, a distance of about 100 miles. All through Luxemburg and Belgium the troops were cheered by Sunday crowds lining the streets of towns and villages. By nightfall the Regiment was encamped in thick pine forests above Schonberg, in the sight of the hills of Germany three miles away.

2 - 3 October

The Regiment remained in bivouac above Schonberg preparing to relieve the 8th Infantry and elements of the 12th Infantry, 4th Division, along an 8,000-yard sector of the Siegfried Line.

4 October

The Regiment entered Germany. First to leave the Schonberg bivouac, at 0330 hours, was a motor column of weapons carriers and prime movers of the Third, First and Second Battalions in that order. In the same order the troops crossed the I. P. at 0400 on the seven-and-a-half-mile march to the front line. It was still dark when they passed the border.

Rain had turned the roads into bogs, and the troops, struggling under full equipment, toiled through darkness and drizzle up one steep hill and down the next. Many of them said afterward that the march into Germany was the most strenuous ordeal of its kind they had experienced in Europe.

By 1130 the Regiment had completed relief of the 4th Division units. The sector it now occupied, primarily as a holding force, ran in a north-south line through the pine forests of the Schnee-Eifel Mountains, forming a salient between Task Force I on the left (north) and the 38th Infantry on the right. Our alignment was Second Battalion on the left, First Battalion in the Center and Third Battalion, less K Company, on the right. K Company and Cannon Company were attached temporarily to Task Force I. The Regimental C. P. was moved from Schonberg to Schlausenbach, Germany, a farming village from which the inhabitants had been evacuated.

Along most of the line open areas, in places two or three thousand yards wide, separated our MLR from the enemy MLR. Within our lines were more than two dozen Siegfried pillboxes previously wrested from the Germans, some of which were used as C. P.'s, by the Battalions and certain companies.

The pattern of deployment down through the companies, platoons and squads was influenced by the location of dugouts, pillboxes and foxholes previously used by the 4th Division. These positions, however, were promptly and constantly expanded

and strengthened and the outpost line changed. With considerably fewer men to hold the same area, every terrain feature had to be used to the best possible advantage. It was impossible to construct a MLR of interlocking bands of fire, or even to maintain a defensive line that could be continuously observed.

The general trace of the Regimental positions ran along the Schnee-Kiffel ridge line, but almost every company was compelled to situate itself around the forward slopes of subsidiary ridge lines or shoulders running at right angles to the main line. Deep draws between these shoulders were constantly used as routes of approach by enemy patrols. Consequently as will be noted by referring to the attached Situation Overlays, a line drawn from north to south connecting every outpost would present a scalloped effect.

One of the difficulties imposed by the extremely large sector was the creation of wide gaps between the outposts. Initially because of these gaps and of the thick woods, small enemy patrols were able to infiltrate to the very center of our positions without too much difficulty. As a result all positions were constructed as independant islands of resistance prepared for all around defense. At night the outposts buttoned up and readied themselves to repel attacks from any direction. Concurrent with the extensive building program instituted in the second week of occupation of these positions was a similarly intensive program of laying tactical and protective wire all along the front. In the extensive gaps that could not be covered by fire, booby traps, anti-personnel mines and trip flares were installed to impede the enemy and alert our out-

posts. By the end of the month thousands of yards of barbed wire had been strung and hundred of mines laid. Total amount of wire was: single strand, 1440 yards; two strands, 2960 yards; three or four strands, 2460; single apron, 825 yards; double apron, 575 yards; number of yards covered by concertina, 13,079. Following are figures on other obstacles: 116 flares with trip wire; 711 fragmentation grenades with trip wire; 332 anti-tank mines, 54 one-half pound blocks of TNT.

Platoons on outpost duty were rotated every 24 hours.

An additional difficulty encountered was the curious composition of the soil which held moisture close to the surface of the ground in high as well as low areas. Thick, sticky mud rendered parts of the few small roads essential for supply almost impassable. Engineer Squads were kept constantly busy maintaining the roads, filling holes and ruts and improving forest paths that had not been used in a long time.

German units known to be defending the Siegfried Line along the 9th Infantry sector were the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Division and the 6th and 11th 9AF Fortress Battalions, units recruited from Luftwaffe personnel. During the month an undetermined number of SS troops were replaced by Volk Grenadiers.

(Casualties: 12 non-battle

(Prisoners taken: 6)

5 October

As enemy patrols probed the First Battalion area, the work of improving and reorganizing positions was begun in earnest all along the line, and our own patrols were organized and vigorous patrolling schedules put into effect.

On orders from Regiment each Battalion organized a Ranger Platoon consisting of one officer, one non-commissioned officer and 15 privates.

These platoons were placed under the supervision of the Battalion S-2. Relieved of all responsibility, except their own local security, and reserved for patrol work alone. Members of the platoon were separately billeted and fed wherever possible. Night patrolling was done by Rangers only.

Each rifle company was instructed to designate for patrol work one officer, one non-commissioned officer and five privates who could be called upon to supplement or replace members of the Ranger Platoons if more officers and men were needed. Until called, however, they remained in their respective units and were used for daylight patrolling.

Regiment established the following as the minimum patrolling schedule:

Daylight

a. Battalions with three companies on line - one combat patrol and two reconnaissance patrols daily.

b. Battalions with two companies on line - one combat patrol and one reconnaissance patrol daily.

c. Contact and security patrols to the flanks and between the outpost line and the Battalion C P.

Night

Each Battalion was to send its Ranger Platoon on a mission each night.

Contact patrols to the flanks were maintained.

Missions of combat patrols, both day and night, were announced by Regimental Headquarters, with special missions ordered on recommendation of Battalion Commanders. Missions of reconnaissance patrols

were announced by Battalion Commanders.

(Casualties: 9 non-battle)

6 October

Enemy patrols attempted to infiltrate through the lines of the First and Second Battalions, and in one of the day's skirmishes B Company killed two Germans.

(Casualties: 2 killed, 8 wounded, 28 non-battle)

7 October

Supported by brisk artillery and mortar fire, an enemy force estimated at between one and two companies attacked E and F Company outposts at 1300 hours, capturing 9 men and wounding several others. The main blow fell on E Company outposts. Six men of the 2nd Platoon who were in the outpost nearest the enemy were surrounded and captured together with three men of the 3rd Platoon who were working on a new outpost line closer to the company's MLR and stood their ground and fought when the attack came. The fate of the men in them was not known definitely until the next day when the Germans dropped propaganda leaflets naming them as prisoners and saying they were being well treated. The leaflets were addressed to the "Guys of the 2nd Infantry Division."

A sharp counter-attack by our forces was made later in the E Company sector. (See 10 October.)

In a skirmish with a forty-man patrol that infiltrated its sector at 0320 and was repulsed Company K suffered four casualties, including one man killed.

Casualties: 1 killed, 8 wounded, 6 non-battle, 10 missing and 6 prisoners taken.

By this time rapid progress was being made in providing for the troops the most comforts and amenities possible under the circumstances.

With steady rains already falling, an extensive program of log-shelter-building was ordered as an essential safeguard of the health of the troops, who otherwise would have had to go on living, perhaps through winter months, in fox-holes, sometimes in water inches deep. The Regiment proved to be rich in log-

cabin architects and improvisers, and slowly the forest took on the appearance of a boom town of log command posts, log kitchens, log squad rooms, log drying rooms and various elaborate log shelters with tin or tile roofs and clay chimneys. Squad shelters usually had sleeping space for four men, with members of the squads taking turns sleeping in them at night in the order of their rotation on guard duty. When the Regiment first went on the line two-man foxholes were standard. In building the log shelters, however, it was decided to permit accommodations for four men for reasons of comfort and morale. At the outposts were log covered dugouts in which men could sleep while not on guard and from which they could fight.

The work of building log shelters was long and arduous. Trees had to be felled, cut into logs and carried to where they were needed. The sound of axes rang through the forest from daylight to dark, and at times, the area resembled a lumber camp as much as a battle line. As an example of the size of the task, the First Battalion was felling more than 400 trees a day at the height of its building program.

But the shelters were not the only new comforts. Inside showers were installed in a house and barn at Schlausenbach, and each day 180 men were brought back to use them. From the showers the men could go to a moving picture, the first of which, "Stars on Parade," was shown on this day. A rest camp with beer, ice cream, cards, books, radio, showers and barber shop was opened by the 2nd Division at Vielsalm, Belgium, with accommodations sufficient to

allow the Regiment to send 135 men and six officers at a time for 48-hour visits. Further comfort was on the way in the form of sleeping bags. (One thousand were issued on 18 October).

Concurrent with new comforts, however, were the inevitable shortages and inconveniences imposed by long supply lines. Bread and coffee were scarce for a few days, and the cigarette situation was critical during most of the month.

S-2 reported: "Enemy artillery and mortar fire for the period was the lightest yet encountered."

{ Casualties: 1 killed
5 wounded
10 non-battle)

9 October

At 0300 a 12-man German patrol infiltrated the K Company sector and reached a point about 1,500 yards from the Regimental C.P. All personnel at the C.P. were alerted, but the patrol was repulsed by K Company's .50-calibre machine guns. Three Germans were believed to have been wounded.

{ Casualties: 4 wounded
6 non-battle)

10 October

A Second Battalion combat patrol consisting of twelve men from E Company, six men from G Company, four men from the Battalion intelligence section and a mortar observer lashed at the enemy in the E Company sector, wiping out a German outpost, killing or seriously wounding eleven men and capturing four others, two of whom were wounded. One member of the patrol was killed and another wounded.

The enemy outpost had been discovered earlier in the day by a six-man patrol from E Company.

Casualties: 1 killed, 1 wounded and 9 non-battle.

11 - 18 October

These were days of patrol warfare along the regimental front. Reconnaissance patrols ranged through the forest observing enemy dispositions, listening for enemy sounds, spotting enemy gun emplacements, seeking out enemy mine fields. Ambush patrols pounced on unwary Germans and brought them back for questioning. Combat patrols jabbed at enemy lines, attacked machine guns, battled enemy patrols. Total casualties for the eight days were: 9 missing, 21 wounded and 88 non-battle. 10 prisoners taken.

(Lt Col H. K. Wesson, Commanding the First Battalion, was fatally wounded by an anti-personnel mine while inspecting positions on 13 October. He died on 15 October.)

19 October

A great increase in enemy artillery was noted. From 1515 to 1530 the Second Battalion area received nine rounds. Between 50 and 60 rounds landed in the rear of L Company and 25 in the rear of I Company soon after 1800. Fifty rounds were hurled at C Company at about the same time, causing two casualties. Throughout the day 62 rockets were fired into the First Battalion area and caused four casualties. Artillery fire was preceded by long-range machine gun tracer fire believed to have been used for target designation. Casualties: 1 missing, 6 wounded and 12 non-battle.

20 October

Enemy artillery fire decreased. At about 1100 hours 25 rounds

landed along the front between L Company and C Company. Three rounds each were received by the First and Second Battalions between 2215 and 2320. Sixteen rockets were fired into A Company area at 1045. No casualties were reported caused by this shelling.

L Company patrols observed Germans building log shelters.

At 0230 two men from M Company were wounded and one man was killed when one of them stepped on an enemy mine-and-dynamite charge in a road. Casualties: 1 killed, 1 missing, 3 wounded and 10 non-battle.

21 October

German flying bombs, of the type used against London, passed over the Regimental sector, some of them directly above above the Regimental C. P. They continued on their way, however, and caused no damage in the immediate vicinity. On this first day of their appearance on this sector eight bombs were counted. Others came over on subsequent days.

The first group from the Regiment to be given 48-hour furloughs in Paris left by truck at 0730. The group consisted of one Officer and sixteen enlisted men. Other groups of about the same number left every two days during the rest of the month.

Enemy mortar fire was considerable.

Various indications of increased enemy activity were noted, particularly on the First Battalion front. Sounds of enemy vehicles and of chopping and digging were heard through-out the day, and at 1120 the Third Battalion O. P. reported a German light tank headed southward. Casualties: 1 wounded and 13 non-battle.

22 October

A Second Battalion patrol engaged six Germans in a fire fight and estimated that four of them were wounded. Two Germans were known to have been wounded by an L Company patrol. Enemy mortar fire continued. Casualties: 2 wounded and 3 non-battle.

The following "Estimate of Enemy Situation" presents a good illustration of the nature of the opposition faced by the Regiment at this time:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BATTALION
NINTH INFANTRY

APC #2, US Army
22 October 1944

Subject; Estimate of Enemy Situation

To : Commanding Officer
Ninth Infantry
APC #2, US Army

Enemy information gained thus far indicates the probable enemy OPLR runs on a line 053867-05558630-05308615-058855-05858485-05758465-04358470-04508475-044847-04258430.

To substantiate this estimation we have the following factual reports to present. For a more comprehensive understanding of our picture we have partitioned our battalion area into three distinct sectors, namely, left, center and right.

Considering the left sector first, we begin at our left flank boundary where we find an enemy outpost on the hill at 054866. The following activity has been reported on or in the vicinity of this hill.

(1) On Oct. 11 an A Co. patrol observed nine men eating at 056864; (2) On Oct. 18 nine enemy at 0548655 fired on an A Co. patrol and 12 more enemy were seen on the eastern slope of this hill. A dead enemy was found the same day at 05258655; (3) On Oct. 14 an anti-tank gun was observed at 0538665 by the 2nd Battalion; (4) Oct. 19 enemy small arms fire was heard at 056865 by an A Co patrol; (5) On Oct. 20 an A Co patrol reported enemy rifle fire at 05358550.

Tying up with the troops at this strongpoint are the troops (estimated at three platoons) bivouaced in the woods 05608635-061862 where 14 wisps of smoke were seen by a Co A patrol October 15. Confirming this information, on Oct. 16 another A Co patrol counted 12 wisps of smoke in these woods.

Consistent negative reports by patrols indicated that the triangle of ground formed by the two creeks coming to a junction at 055863 is not occupied by the enemy, nor is the wooded part of the ridge running generally from 048861-055862.

However, the road fork at 056862 is covered by a squad of men and a machine gun as indicated by the following reports; (1) On Oct. 9 an A Co. patrol saw enemy chopping wood at 055862; (2) On Oct 12 an A Co patrol saw four enemy along the thin strip of woods at 05608625 and 05608420; (3) On Oct. 13 an A Co patrol

killed or wounded three enemy at 05550630 and saw seven other enemy here. The patrol was fired on by a machine gun at 054062. In addition the patrol heard chopping at 05708625; (4) The ranger patrol of Oct. 17 was fired on by one machine gun, four rifles at 05550615.

From here we move east in our sector and find a reinforced platoon holding down the reverse slope defense along the ridge from 053861-050855. We base this on the following information: (1) On Oct 15 a patrol from A Co saw three enemy at 054861 in dugouts, and three going to a cabin, a CP, at 05308610. The patrol heard voices of 20 or more men and considerable chopping at 05508615. (2) Adding to our information, on Oct. 16, an A Co patrol saw 10 men enter and leave two dugouts in the field at 054861. The patrol also saw machine gun emplacements at 05458615 and 05758595. This patrol also reported a machine gun at 057858, in addition to the other two previously reported. Four more enemy were seen at 056858 by this patrol. (3) Providing information for the fourth known machine gun is the report of Co A's outpost of Oct 10 telling of machine gun fire at 057855.

Further indicating that there are troops dug in on this reverse slope are the following reports: (1) On Oct. 16 Co B reported 10 enemy fires at 058855; (2) On Oct 11 Co B patrol heard eight voices at 056857; (3) Co B patrol on Oct 20 heard 20 or more voices at 056857 and small arms fire from here. An A Co patrol on Oct 20 confirmed this report; (4) A Co. patrol on Oct 20 heard wood chopping at 056857 and a rifle shot from 05408605. In addition they saw five enemy crossing the field at 06058595 and heard more chopping of wood at 05658590; (5) Voices were heard by B Co. patrol on Oct. 10 at 058856.

One strip of the ridge is mined and barbed wire has been installed in some places. On Oct. 16 A Co's outpost saw two enemy laying mines at 057856 and an enemy laying barbed wire on Oct. 19 in the same vicinity, Oct 21, enemy was heard hammering at stakes here.

We now turn to the center of our sector where we have found relatively little enemy activity. We do know the enemy has a part-time listening post at 053854. In two instances we have observed one or two enemy observing here, only to find the wooded draw vacated the following day by patrols.

On Oct 8 a Co B patrol saw three enemy in this draw and on Oct 10 another B Co patrol saw two enemy here. However, on Oct 11 the draw was found not occupied by B Co patrol. On Oct 13 two (2) enemy were again seen in this draw, but again a ranger patrol found no enemy here on Oct 14.

The road at 057850 is used as a supply route for the enemy's reverse slope defense, and traffic has been heard on it at various times. On Oct 8 a B Co patrol heard a heavy truck on this road, while on Oct 10 another B Co patrol reported two trucks and one motorcycle on this road. On Oct 14 B Co again reported traffic on this road.

A B Co patrol which spent the entire days of Oct 15 and 17 on the hill at 054849 reported no activity in the draw at 053854, but saw one man come out of Wascheid and pick vegetables at 056851.

Wascheid is the probable supply point and aid station for the enemy on our left and the communications trench running from Wascheid along the draw at 055847 to 04858470 to supply the enemy on our right. The trench was used by 15 enemy to go to and from Wascheid Oct. 15 and 17. In addition, B Co has seen supplies and litters carried back and forth along this trench every day since we have gone into position.

On our right flank we find another strongpoint around the hill at 046845, manned by a company, less one platoon. An outpost and observation post is set up across the draw at 043846 in the woods at 044844. Five machine guns are known to be at this strong point; one at 04608475 commanding the draw at 046849; second at 045847 commanding the road net at 04708475; a third at 044846 commanding the draw at 044846 commanding a draw at 04358460; and the fourth and fifth at 047844 and 0480-8385 respectively for harassing fire purposes.

23 October

Reconnaissance patrols were active on both sides. Enemy artillery fire decreased. K Company left Task Force X and returned to the control of the 9th Infantry. The company was placed in reserve.

{ Casualties: 1 wounded
4 non-battle)

24 October

Enemy patrols were very active, and enemy artillery fire, some of it believed to have been from long-range guns, was considerable, although it caused no casualties.

An enemy patrol worked its way to within 25 yards of B Company's first outpost and fired on the contact patrol. The Germans withdrew, however, when brought under fire. Guide lines between B and C Companies were found cut in several places.

At 1245 An A Company patrol engaged in a fire fight with an enemy force, losing one man and capturing two wounded Germans. Both of the prisoners died soon afterward. An L Company patrol killed three Germans and possibly wounded a fourth.

Cannon Company returned to the control of the 9th Infantry.

{ Casualties: 2 wounded
9 non-battle
1 missing)

25 October

Enemy artillery was active. At 1130 27 rounds of artillery and mortar fell in the First Battalion area. At 1700 12 rounds fell in A Company area. The Second Battalion reported four casualties caused by more than 30 rounds received during the period.

At 0940 B Company's No. 2 outpost reported six enemy approaching. A combat patrol was dispatched from C Company, flanking the Germans and killing one of them before the enemy withdrew.

At 1115 a First Battalion reconnaissance patrol was ambushed by a group of six or eight Germans, who opened fire with two machine pistols. The patrol returned the fire, and the enemy withdrew with one man known to have been wounded.

{ Casualties: 1 missing
5 wounded
7 non-battle)

26 October

The Regiment received the severest artillery shelling it had yet encountered in Germany and one of the severest it had encountered since landing in France on 7 June. The fire apparently was timed to catch our troops while they were supposedly congregated for breakfast.

Between 0600 and 0820 approximately 965 rounds of artillery and mortar fell in the Second Battalion area. Two hundred rounds fell in the First Battalion area between 0645 and 0745, of which 100 rounds landed in A Company area between 0645 and 0705. There were no indications that the Germans planned to attack under cover of the artillery, and the shelling made no marked difference in the casualty trend. (See figures below).

The Third Battalion was relieved by the attached 27th Armored Infantry Battalion and went into Division reserve in a rest area near the Division C. P. at St. Vith, Belgium. The Battalion was

billeted with civilians in three villages, Born, Medell and Meyerode.

The 27th Armored Infantry Battalion kept one company in reserve in case of attack anywhere along the regimental front. This company was acquainted with routes into each company area so that it could move swiftly to any point that might be threatened. Casualties: 1 killed, 5 wounded and 10 non-battle. 2 Prisoners taken.

27 October

Enemy artillery fire was again heavy. Between 0650 and 0725 151 rounds of heavy mortar and artillery fire fell in the Second Battalion area. Twelve more rounds fell at 1145 and between 60 and 70 landed in the interval from 1212 to 1227. From 0645 to 1225 85 rounds fell in the First Battalion area. Of these 40 rounds landed in A Company area and around the Battalion Aid Station between 0645 and 0700. Fifteen rockets landed in C Company area at 1225. As a result of the shelling the First Battalion suffered five casualties, including one man killed.

Enemy night patrols were active.

Casualties: 3 killed, 4 wounded and 11 non-battle.

28 October

Enemy artillery continued to fall throughout the regimental sector, most of it landing in the First and Second Battalion areas. Sixty-two rounds of rocket and mortar fire fell in the First Battalion area during the day and 88 Mortar and artillery rounds in the Second Battalion area.

A seven-man enemy patrol ran into a Second Battalion ambush

and the two scouts were fired on and believed killed.

{ Casualties: 1 wounded
5 non-battle

29 October

Enemy artillery lessened considerably. Forty rounds of rocket and mortar fire fell in the First Battalion area and ten in the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion area.

An ambush patrol from B Company fired on four Germans at 1945 and estimated that three of them were wounded.

(Casualties: 5 non-battle)

30 October

Enemy artillery was limited to scattered rounds, most of them landing at night in the First and Second Battalion areas.

A First Battalion patrol engaged six Germans in a fire fight, and all the enemy were hit.

(Casualties: 9 non-battle)

(Prisoners taken: 1)

31 October

No enemy artillery was reported and only scattered rounds of mortar. Enemy activity was generally quiet during the night.

{ Casualties: 1 wounded
2 non-battle)

Total casualties for October were:

Killed	10
Wounded	72
Missing	23
Non-battle	268
	<u>373</u>

Replacements received, all former members of the Regiment:
60 Officers - 371 Enlisted Men.

Twenty-five prisoners were taken during the month

For the Regiment October was a month of readjustment from the hedgerow and house-to-house fighting of former campaigns to the mountain and forest warfare of the Siegfried Line; a month of solidifying positions, training new men, feeling out enemy strength and dispositions, building up supplies and of preparing shelters to protect the troops from cold and rainy weather. October was a month of unusually heavy rains. As the period ended morale was excellent, and the Regiment was ready for whatever mission it was to be given in the drive through Germany.

SECRET

SECRET
Auth: 2d Inf Div.
Date: December 1944.
Initials: *W.E.*

*APD
ETO*

HEADQUARTERS NINTH INFANTRY

APO #2, U. S. Army,
5 December 1944.

SUBJECT: Action Against Enemy, Reports
After/After Action Report.

TO : Commanding General,
First United States Army,
APO 230.

THRU : Commanding General,
2d Infantry Division,
APO #2, U. S. Army.

Submitted herewith Action Against Enemy, Reports After/
After Action Reports for the month of November, 1944.

For the Regimental Commander:

W. E. Whitney
W. E. WHITNEY,
Capt, 9th Inf,
Adjutant.

- 3 Incls:
Incl 1 - After Action Report.
Incl 2 - Unit Journal.
Incl 3 - Unit Journal File.

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November 1944

November on the 9th Infantry sector of the Siegfried Line in Germany was a month of contending alternately with deep snow, thick mud and heavy rains and of constant give-and-take war with the enemy, in which the Regiment, as usual, gave more than it took. It was a month that for the older members aroused memories of the 1943 winter maneuvers at Watersmeet, Mich.

The Regiment throughout November continued to hold the sector it had taken over on 4 October in a pine forest along a ridge of the Schnee-Eifel Mountains. This sector at mid-month was a scene that might have been borrowed from a painting of the winter at Valley Forge, a scene of small groups of soldiers huddled around fires that could be built by day, of guards standing at their posts in snow several inches deep, of men chopping logs for their cabins and shelters.

Patrols roamed the forest by night and day attacking German outposts, reconnoitering German positions, ambushing German patrols. Many of these German patrols were clad in white camouflage uniforms. Our patrols experimented with wearing full-length white underwear over regular uniforms. The period in which the ground was covered with snow was from 9 November to 20 November.

While our artillery fire increased steadily in intensity during the month, the 9th Infantry crammed liberal doses of machine gun, mortar and 105mm howitzer harassing fire down the enemy's throat on an expanding daily schedule. For example, the number of .50-calibre machine gun rounds fired on this

schedule increased from 350 on 1 November to 20,000 rounds on 23 November. The number of all types (heavy, light, white phosphorous) of 81mm mortar rounds rose from 100 on 1 November to 559 on 18 November. In the same period the number of 60mm rounds of harassing fire rose from 100 to 313.

Harassing fire was controlled by Regiment. In the case of the .50-calibre machine guns, three firing positions were established at strategic points, ten guns in each, and could be fired in battery. To achieve high concentration of fire all guns of one position fired in battery on the same target. In this manner the cone of dispersion covered a sizable area. When firing positions were active at the same time, targets were selected in such a way that the cones of fire from all positions constituted one continuous concentration. Firing times changed from day to day.

On 11 November the time was 1100 hours. While an Armistice Day artillery barrage thundered overhead, the 9th Infantry saluted the occasion with 20 .50-calibre machine gun rounds per gun, 8 .30-calibre machine gun rounds per gun, 18 81mm rounds per mortar, 27 60mm mortar rounds per mortar and 6 105mm howitzer rounds per gun, all fired on known or suspected targets. The enemy's first reaction was 6 rounds of 80mm mortar fired at A Company. Other rounds of enemy mortar and light artillery landed soon after 1100 hours in the areas of E, C, L and F Companies.

Buzz bombs, first seen over the 9th Infantry sector on 21 October, fell in considerable number in and around the area during November, causing no casualties and only minor damage. One of them crashed on 22 November after passing through a cone of our .50-calibre machine gun harassing fire. On 12 November a trailer and its contents, including four M1 rifles, several pistols and a pair of binoculars, were damaged by a compressed air tank that hurtled to earth behind the 2nd Battalion Headquarters Company mess after the bomb, of which it was a part, had crashed in F Company without exploding. The first of the bombs to land in the area struck near the Aww road 700 yards west of the Regimental C. P. in Schlausenbach at 2305 on 1 November. Glass in the transom over the C. P. door was broken by the blast and windows were blown out in the mess hall situated in a barn nearby.

This was only the beginning of trouble for C. P. personnel, however, as the Germans took to shelling Schlausenbach spasmodically throughout the month principally during the hours of darkness. Five shells landed in the C. P. area in the early hours of 5 November. On the night of 16-17 November 15 shells were fired at the village, and these were followed by another 12 between 2200 and 2300 hours on 17 November. A more severe shelling occurred before dawn on 21 November. Twenty-five 105mm rounds slammed into Schlausenbach, ripping down wires and shattering windows, including those in the C. P., message center, and Colonel C. J. Hirschfelder's house. One shell crashed through the roof

of the house in which a squad of the I. and S. platoon was quartered and exploded in an unoccupied second-floor bedroom. Men sleeping in an adjoining room were not injured. A short distance away another shell damaged the jeep of the I.P.W. Team. Toward the end of the month a few shells landed in the C.P. area during daylight hours.

None of the shellings caused casualties. Living quarters were sandbagged, and, with an eye to possibly graver measures by the desperate enemy, an air-raid warning siren was installed outside the C.P. on 20 November.

The callousing work the men of the 9th Infantry performed in October building log shelters paid off in November in dividends of comfort and health. When the snow came the Regiment was prepared for it with warm squad shelters, platoon drying-rooms, well protected dugouts, log kitchens and C.Ps.

However, the task of providing comfortable shelters did not end with October. All during November the men worked to improve and rain-proof their shelters and to build new ones where the old had proved inadequate. Chinks between logs were filled with mud. Extensions were built. Walls were lined with cardboard from the kitchen and buttressed by dirt-filled ammunition boxes, and floors and ceilings were made out of salvaged lumber. Endless types of improvised stoves made their appearance, some fashioned out of German helmets and gas mask cans. Some of the cabins were elaborate. The 1st Battalion Ranger platoon, for example, had a cabin with curtains, a hand-painted lamp, rug, table, bunks, even a doorbell - a bicycle bell affixed above the entrance. By the end of the month the number of living quarters completed was 410, of drying-rooms 34.

Not all the work went into sleeping-shelters and drying-rooms. Mess halls and latrines were built. Battalion C. Ps. were enlarged by the addition of log pavilions at the front of the pillboxes. F Company constructed a new outpost line. Throughout the Regimental sector new fire lines were cut and old ones cleared of fallen branches. To protect vehicles from shrapnel "jeep stalls" were constructed - three-sided roodless garages. And as a safeguard against immersion foot ("trench foot") wood platforms were built in guard posts. Companies were directed to have dry socks available for every man at all times.

The work of maintaining supply roads went on during probably every daylight hour of the month. Snow and rain made some of the roads almost impassable. During the thaw that set in on 17 November, to cite one case, stretches of the supply road leading to K Company were under water deep enough to cover the wheels of a jeep. In some places, notably the 1st Battalion, new roads had to be built as substitutes for old ones on which vehicles could be seen by the enemy since the leaves had fallen.

The constant work of making the forest habitable imposed manpower problems on company commanders, who were faced every day with the task of striking a balance between men going on work details, men going on pass or to the showers or on sick call and men required for security.

Opposing the 9th Infantry during November were the 294th Regiment and the 6th and 7th Companies of the 295th Regiment of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division. Included among these troops were former Navy personnel and soldiers transferred from Denmark.

Life in the 9th Infantry in November, however, was not all work and war. The Regiment continued to send men to Paris on furlough and to rest camps. In addition to the 2nd Division rest camp opened in Vielselm, Belgium, in October, another and more luxurious one was opened in November by VIII Corps in a chateau at Arlon, Belgium. Every 48 hours the Regiment sent 135 men and 6 officers to Vielselm and 15 men and one officer to Arlon. Every fourth day 22 men and 2 officers left for Paris. Moving pictures and showers remained part of the daily schedule. P. L. rations were more liberal in November than in the preceeding month; there was no recurrence of the October cigarette shortage. And Thanksgiving, 23 November, was observed in the best tradition possible under the circumstances, with 4,847 pounds of turkey - one and a half pounds a man - and cranberry sauce.

The day-by-day after-action report follows:

1 November

As the period began the 3d Battalion, after a week in Division reserve, relieved the 2d Battalion, which, in turn, reverted to Division reserve. This placed the 3d Battalion, Originally on the right of the Regimental sector, on the left, with the 1st Battalion in the center and the 27th Armored Infantry Battalion, temporarily under control of the 9th Infantry, on the right.

Thirty-one rounds of artillery fell in the 2nd Battalion area between 0600 and 0640. At 2305 a buzz bomb landed 700 yards west of the Regimental C. P. Casualties: 1 Wounded, 7 non-battle. Replacements: 3

2 November

Enemy artillery was light, with only 6 rounds reported..
Fifty-four rounds of enemy mortar fire landed in the 3d
Battalion between 2140 and 2218..

Casualties: 1 wounded; 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 10

Prisoners taken: 2

3 November

Enemy activity was light. Only scattered mortar fire was
received.

Casualties: 7 non-battle.

Replacements: 24

4 November

Enemy activity was limited to light artillery and mortar
fire.

Casualties: 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 7

Prisoners taken: 1

5 November

Enemy artillery was fairly active. Ten shells landed in the
1st Battalion and 5 in the Regimental C. P. area.

Casualties: 13 non-battle.

Replacements: 3

6 November

Thirty-six rockets landed to the right of C Company and in
a draw between C Company and the 27th Armored Battalion..

Casualties: 1 wounded; 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 10

7 November

A four-man enemy patrol approached the first outpost of A Company, but retired when fired on. Two Germans were believed to have been wounded. Thirty-seven rounds of mortar and artillery fell in the 3rd Battalion, 6 in the 1st Battalion.

Casualties: 4 wounded; 7 non-battle.

Prisoners taken: 4

8 November

Enemy patrols in front of A and C Companies were turned back by our mortar fire. Fifty-eight rounds of enemy mortar and artillery fell in and to the left of the 1st Battalion area.

The original alignment on the Regimental sector was restored as the 2nd Battalion returned from Division reserve and the 27th Armored Battalion withdrew to another sector. The 2nd Battalion was now on the left, the 1st Battalion in the center and the 3rd Battalion on the right. As was the case when the 27th Battalion was on the right, the 3rd Battalion held one Company - K - out of line as a counterattack force under the command of Regiment. K Company was ordered to be in readiness to move to any part of the Regimental front threatened by enemy attack.

Casualties: 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 15.

9 November

Action was limited to patrolling and light enemy artillery.

Casualties: 11 wounded; 12 non-battle.

Replacements: 3.

10 November

Forty-one rounds of enemy mortar landed in the 1st Battalion, 10 rounds in the 2nd Battalion.

Casualties: 1 wounded; 11 non-battle.

Replacements: 12

Prisoners taken: 1

11 November

At 1100 hours Regimental organic weapons, supported by Tank Destroyer weapons, fired an Armistice Day salvo. All fire was directed against known or suspected targets. The enemy returned the fire. During the day 66 rounds of mortar fire landed in A Company, 57 in E and F Companies, and 25 near L Company.

Casualties: 23 non-battle.

Replacements: 1

12 November

Our mortars fired on three enemy soldiers approaching A Company. One of the enemy was wounded and captured, the others fled. Eighteen rounds of enemy mortar fire landed in G Company, 40 in I and L Companies, 20 of them near L Company C. P., and 30 between C and L Companies.

Casualties: 13 non-battle.

Replacements: 16

Prisoners taken: 1

13 November

At 0400 hours a small enemy patrol was reported 25 yards in front of B Company outposts. Our machine guns opened fire. The Germans answered it with 11 handgrenades and 20 mortar rounds, and then withdrew. Sixteen enemy mortar rounds landed in front of E and F Companies.

Casualties: 2 Killed, 11 wounded, 10 non-battle.

Replacements: 3.

Prisoners taken: 1.

14 November

Enemy activity was limited to light artillery fire.

Casualties: 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 6.

15 November

The 1st Battalion Ranger patrol ambushed an eight-man enemy patrol and killed the leader.

Casualties: 13 non-battle.

Replacements: 57.

16 November

The 2nd Battalion Ranger patrol encountered an enemy outpost and killed one of the men in it. A patrol from B Company wounded one of the enemy in a fire fight. Fifteen artillery shells landed in the Regimental C. P. area between 162300 and 170246.

Casualties: 9 non-battle.

Replacements: 70

Prisoners taken: 1.

17 November

The 2nd Battalion Ranger platoon suffered three casualties from enemy mines. Enemy mortar fire increased, with 37 rounds falling in the 2nd Battalion, 19 in the 1st Battalion and 2 in the 3rd Battalion. Twelve rounds of enemy artillery landed in the Regimental C.P. between 2200 and 2300 hours. Five 88mm rounds burst in front of the 3rd Battalion C. P. at 2245.

In front of the 3rd Battalion C. P. at 1230 the enemy made a propaganda broadcast. The answer: an artillery barrage.

Casualties: 3 wounded, 15 non-battle.

Replacements: 4.

18 November

Enemy mortar and artillery fire was considerable. One hundred and thirteen rounds fell to the right of the 1st Battalion around 1100 hours. Twenty artillery and mortar rounds fell in the 3rd Battalion, and 12 rounds of heavy artillery landed in the 1st Battalion. During hours of darkness the 1st and 3rd Battalions received harassing machine gun fire.

Casualties: 3 wounded, 15 non-battle.

Replacements: 3.

Prisoners taken: 1.

19 November

Enemy harassing mortar and artillery fire continued. Over a 24-hour period the 2nd Battalion received 54 mortar and 21 artillery rounds. Two 12-round concentrations fell in C Company, and 1 round of heavy artillery fell in A Company. Fifty-six rounds fell in and around the 3rd Battalion. No casualties were

caused by this fire.

The 1st Battalion Ranger Patrol killed one German and silenced an enemy machine gun. Three enemy outposts were located by the 3rd Battalion Ranger patrol.

Casualties: 2 wounded, 20 non-battle.

Replacements: 7.

20 November

New evidence of a profusion of German mine and booby traps was discovered by a 3d Battalion Ranger patrol. The patrol, after penetrating the first belt of minefields, encountered other minefields beyond, consisting of S-Mines, Schu mines, egg grenades and various kinds of booby traps. Said the S-2 report: "The patrol ran into a maze of booby traps and mines, with S-mines predominating. They were spaced about every five yards, although no definite pattern could be determined." When the patrol was returning from its mission, one of the men was wounded by a Schu mine.

Thirty-three rounds of artillery and 28 rounds of mortar fell in the Regimental sector during the period.

Casualties: 1 wounded, 9 non-battle.

Replacements: 16.

21 November

Between 0331 and 0647 25 105mm rounds fell near the Regimental C. P. in Schlausenbach, causing minor damage but no casualties. Between 1545 and 1600 64 rounds of heavy mortar and 5 rounds of artillery fire fell in the 1st Battalion area and 37 rounds of heavy mortar in the 2nd Battalion area. Three casualties were caused by this shelling.

Casualties: Wounded, 11 Non-Battle.

Replacements: 4.

22 November

A 1st Battalion Ranger patrol encountered a four-man enemy patrol at 1000 hours, and in an ensuing fire fight, two of the Germans were believed to have been wounded.

Four unidentified planes were heard circling over the front-line area of the 1st and 3rd Battalions.

During the period 40 rounds of enemy artillery and 136 rounds of mortar fell in the Regimental sector.

Casualties: 1 Wounded, 13 Non-Battle.

Replacements: 35.

23 November

Enemy artillery and patrols were active. At 1825 hours an enemy patrol was discovered approaching the No. 1 outpost of A Company. Fired on from the No. 2 outpost, the patrol began moving toward outpost No. 3. A fire fight, in which one of our men was wounded, ensued, but the patrol withdrew after A Company mortars opened fire.

Casualties: 3 Wounded, 11 Non-Battle.

Replacements: 4.

24 November

Enemy activity was light. German artillery in the Regimental Sector consisted of 13 rounds - 9 in the 1st Battalion area, 3 in the 3rd Battalion and 1 between the 2nd Battalion and the Regimental C.P. Three unidentified aircraft were reported over the front lines during the night.

Casualties: 4 wounded, 8 Non-Battle.

Replacements: 7.

25 November

A 2nd Battalion Ranger patrol was believed to have killed a German surprised near the enemy lines. A 3d Battalion Ranger patrol encountered two Germans and pursued them in hope of locating a gap in the enemy minefields.

Thirty-four rounds of enemy artillery and 86 rounds of mortar fell in the Regimental area during the period.

Casualties: 2 wounded, 12 non-battle.

Replacements: 10

26 November

A 2nd Battalion Ranger patrol fired on two Germans. Results of the fire could not be determined. Third Battalion Ranger patrols found many anti-personnel mines and pull-type booby traps, some of which were found on small pine trees. Enemy artillery consisted of 72 rounds, more than half of them falling in the 3d Battalion area.

Casualties: 2 wounded, 14 non-battle.

Replacements: 9

27 November

S-2 reported: "Enemy shelling for the period was the lightest yet encountered, with 8 rounds of medium mortar falling in the rear of F Company at 0940 and 1 round of light artillery in the vicinity of the Regimental C. P. at 1420."

Loud Screaming was heard on the German line when our mortars fired on known enemy positions. Unidentified planes circled over the 3d Battalion.

Casualties: 1 wounded, 8 non-battle.

Replacements: 1

13 November

One of the most unusual patrol incidents of the Regiment's campaign in Germany up to this time occurred on this day. The patrol involved was a 3d Battalion Ranger patrol consisting of 2nd Lt. Paul A. Brooks, of K Company, and 15 men. On approaching the German lines, members of the patrol spotted two dugouts behind concertina wire and while others covered them, five went through the wire to investigate. Pvt 1st Class Billie B. Hill, of K Company, looked in the first dugout, and finding it empty, went on to the second. Just as he reached it he saw a German running away through the woods. Pfc. Hill fired at him with a sub-machine gun, and the German fell dead. The sound of the shots scarcely had died away, however, when a rifle bullet whined out of the second dugout almost beneath Pfc. Hill's feet. Lt. Brooks fired into the dugout with a sub-machine gun. There was a pause, then a rifle was tossed out as a gesture of surrender, and a German crawled out after it. Members of the patrol surrounded him to take him back to the American lines. When the group was passing through the concertina, the German suddenly shouted, "Mines, mines!" and reached down and pulled a wire. The air was shattered by an explosion.

Lt. Brooks was struck in the foot. Pfc. Aurelius A. Arquin, of K Company, fell with shrapnel in his leg, and Pfc. Hill's clothes were torn by the blast. The German moaned. He had been blown five feet in the air and landed on his head. In another moment he was dead. His detonating the mine may have been an act of suicide or panic. Lt. Brooks and members of the patrol were of the opinion that the German had decided to risk his life

life on a desperate gamble to destroy his captors and escape.

Lt. Brooks was not hurt seriously enough to be evacuated.

A 2nd Battalion Ranger patrol fired on four Germans, inflicting one casualty.

Enemy artillery fire continued light.

Casualties: 2 wounded, 6 non-battle.

Replacements: 23.

29 November

A 2nd Battalion Ranger patrol shot a German outguard.

More enemy mines were discovered. Enemy artillery was light.

Casualties: 1 wounded, 5 non-battle.

Replacements: 1.

30 November

Enemy activity was light. No artillery fire was received and only 6 mortar rounds, all in front of F Company.

Casualties: 7 non-battle.

Replacements: 9.

Prisoners taken: 2.

Total casualties for November were:

Killed	Wounded	Non-battle
2	56	304

The month's replacement total was 373. Fourteen prisoners were taken.

As the month ended there was evidence of a thinning of enemy forces opposing the 9th Infantry. The prisoners taken on 30 November said that the enemy sector previously held by the 2nd Battalion of the 294th Volks Grenadier Regiment was now held by the 7th Company of the 295th V. G. R., while the 6th Company, 295th V. G. R., they believed, had been spread out to cover its own front and the front previously held by the 7th Company.